Externalities and the Nucleolus
Mikel Álvarez-Mozos and
Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en Ã©conomie quantitative, CIREQ
In most economic applications, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the nucleolus from (coalitional) games without externalities to games with externalities. This is in contrast to the Shapley value and the core for which many different extensions have been proposed.
Keywords: externalities; partition function; nucleolus; reduced game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
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Working Paper: Externalities and the nucleolus (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:08-2017
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