A Characterization of Exact Non-atomic Market Games

Massimiliano Amarante

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: Continuous exact non-atomic games are naturally associated to certain operators between Banach spaces. It thus makes sense to study games by means of the corresponding operators. We characterize non-atomic exact market games in terms of the properties of the associated operators. We also prove a separation theorem for weak compact sets of countably additive measures, which is of independent interest.

Keywords: lower/upper envelopes; separation theorem; exact games; nonatomic market games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: A characterization of exact non-atomic market games (2014)
Working Paper: A Characterization of Exact Non-atomic Market Games (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:12-2013

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