On Complexity of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda

Robin Christian, Mike Fellows, Frances Rosamond and Arkadii Slinko

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: In this paper we show that lobbying in conditions of “direct democracy” is virtually impossible, even in conditions of complete information about voters preferences, since it would require solving a very computationally hard problem. We use the apparatus of parametrized complexity for this purpose.

Keywords: lobbying; referendum; parametrized complexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:13-2006

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