Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

Walter Bossert, Jean Derks and Hans Peters

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games (2005)
Working Paper: Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games (2001)
Working Paper: Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:2001-14

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