COMMON AGENCY WITH ADVERSE SELECTION: EXISTENCE, UNIQUENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF SEPARATION EQUILIBRIUM

Ugurhan Berkok

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Keywords: adverse selection; contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 1989
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Related works:
Journal Article: Common agency with adverse selection: Existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of separation equilibrium (1990)
Working Paper: Common Agency with Adverse Selection: Existence, Uniqueness and Efficiency of Separation Equilibrium (1989)
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