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MORAL HAZARD, OPTIMAL AUDITING AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Georges Dionne, St-Michel, P. and C. Vanasse

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Keywords: risque moral; accidents; tests; marche du travail (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1989
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Working Paper: Moral Hazard, Optimal Auditing and Workers' Compensation (1989)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:8941

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