Pleasures of Cockaigne: a Story of Quality Gaps, Market Structure and Demand for Grading Services

A. Hollander, Sylvette Monier-Dilhan and H. Ossard

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: This paper explores under what circumstances high-quality producers would not voluntarily submit grading when low-quality firms would readily do sa, and under what conditions high-quality firms would have a lesser proportion if their ouput graded than low-quality counterparts. It also investigates how market structure affects the decision to engage in grading. In thsi regard, the paper establishes how the prices of graded as well as ungraded output varies with the amount of output graded and the extent to which market structure determines whether the amounts graded by individual firms will yield an industry outcome, which is optimal from a social welfare point of view.

Keywords: AGRICULTURE; MARKETS STRUCTURES; PRICES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 Q13 Q14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Pleasures of Cockaigne: a Story of Quality Gaps, Market Structure and Demand for Grading Services (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:9804

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sharon BREWER ().