The decentralization of punishments in experiments with public goods

Zuzana Berná () and Jiří Špalek

MUNI ECON Working Papers from Masaryk University

Abstract: This paper deals with the effects of introducing adequate punishment opportunities in experiments with public goods. Decentralized punishment means that the contributing subjects have a possibility to sanction free riders without the intervention of an external authority. The very first experiments demonstrated a significantly positive effect of a punishment opportunity on enhancing cooperation in situations of social dilemma. Following studies, however, pointed at limited effectiveness of this mechanism. The first part of the paper summarizes selected literature on the topic and presents its principal findings. The second part is dedicated to the presentation of the results of an experimental series on decentralized punishment realized in the Czech Republic. The last part introduces possible questions and topics which may be subject of future research within this area.

Keywords: economic experiment; cooperation; public goods; decentralized punishment; partner and stranger matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2012-12, Revised 2013-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mub:wpaper:05

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