Surveillance cues do not enhance altruistic behavior among anonymous strangers in the field

Erik J. Koornneef, Aurelie Dariel, Iffat Elbarazi, Ahmed R. Alsuwaidi, Paul B.M. Robben and Nikos Nikiforakis ()

No 20180017, Working Papers from New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science

Abstract: The degree of altruistic behavior among strangers is an evolutionary puzzle. A prominent explanation is the evolutionary legacy hypothesis according to which an evolved reciprocity-based psychology affects behavior even when reciprocity is impossible, i.e., altruistic behavior in such instances is maladaptive. Empirical support for this explanation comes from laboratory experiments showing that surveillance cues, e.g., photographs of watching eyes, increase altruistic behavior. A competing interpretation for this evidence, however, is that the cues signal the experimenter’s expectations and participants, aware of being monitored, intentionally behave more altruistically to boost their reputation. Here we report the first results from a field experiment on the topic in which participants are unaware they are being monitored and reciprocity is precluded. The experiment investigates the impact of surveillance cues on a textbook example of altruistic behavior – hand hygiene prior to treating a ‘patient’. We find no evidence surveillance cues affect hand hygiene, despite using different measures of hand-hygiene quality and cues that have been previously shown to be effective. We argue that surveillance cues may have an effect only when participants have reasons to believe they are actually monitored. Thus they cannot support claims altruistic behavior between strangers is maladaptive.

Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2018-05, Revised 2018-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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