The Determinants of Multilateral Bargaining: A Comprehensive Analysis of Baron and Ferejohn Majoritarian Bargaining Experiments

Andrzej Baranski and Rebecca Morton

No 20200037, Working Papers from New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science

Abstract: We collected and analyzed the data sets of all majoritarian Baron and Ferejohn (1989 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.)experiments through 2018. By exploiting the variation of experimental parameters we are able to identify how group size, discount, voting weights, and institutional variables such as communication, affect the distribution of the surplus, proposer power, and agreement delay. We conduct the first structural estimation of the proposer's share equilibrium prediction and find little support for the theory. We also report on behavior following a disagreement and and strong evidence of history-dependent strategies in the form of punishment toward failed proposers and their supporters.

Pages: 62 pages
Date: 2020-01, Revised 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The determinants of multilateral bargaining: a comprehensive analysis of Baron and Ferejohn majoritarian bargaining experiments (2022)
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