Majoritarian Bargaining over Budgetary Divisions and Policy

Andrzej Baranski, Nicholas Haas (nick.haas@ps.au.dk) and Rebecca Morton

No 20200052, Working Papers from New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science

Abstract: We report the results of a field-in-the-lab experiment in which subjects bargain over a two-dimensional agenda: a donation to a political interest group and the division of a sum of money. We show that subjects sacrifice monetary gains to secure preferred policies and that behaviorally elicited preference intensity correlates with bargaining behavior. We find an ideological majority advantage and a status- quo premium. Minorities benefit most from negotiating on two dimensions because the budgetary division problem allows compromise. Finally, we show that induced preferences over artificial policies fail to capture the bargaining dynamics that arise when real ideological choices are involved.

Pages: 73 pages
Date: 2020-07, Revised 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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