Where do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities
Brice Fabre () and
Marc Sangnier ()
Additional contact information
Brice Fabre: Paris School of Economics (PSE) and Institut des Politiques Publiques (IPP)
No 2202, DeFiPP Working Papers from University of Namur, Development Finance and Public Policies
This paper uses French data to simultaneously estimate the impact of two types of connections on government subsidies allocated to municipalities. We distinguish between municipalities in which ministers held office before being appointed to the government, and those where they lived as children. Exploiting ministersâ€™ entries into and exits from the government, we show that cities where a minister was mayor receive 30% more investment subsidies when the politician they are linked to enters into the government, and a similar size decrease when the minister leaves. We do not find these outcomes for cities that ministers lived in as children.
Pages: 47 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-eur and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://defipp.unamur.be/wp/defipp_wp_2022_2.pdf First version, 2022 (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nam:defipp:2202
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in DeFiPP Working Papers from University of Namur, Development Finance and Public Policies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by François-Xavier Ledru ().