Delegation in the family

Jean-Marie Baland (), Marie Boltz (), Catherine Guirkinger (), Anna Jolivet () and Roberta Ziparo ()
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Jean-Marie Baland: Development Finance and Public Policies, University of Namur
Marie Boltz: BETA, University of Strasbourg
Catherine Guirkinger: Development Finance and Public Policies, University of Namur
Anna Jolivet: Development Finance and Public Policies, University of Namur
Roberta Ziparo: AMSE, Aix-Marseille University

No 2605, DeFiPP Working Papers from University of Namur, Development Finance and Public Policies

Abstract: Non-participation in household decisions is commonly interpreted as weak empowerment. We challenge this interpretation by showing that non-participation can be a strategic choice — a form of delegation — when a spouse expects the decision outcome to be sufficiently close to her preferences regardless of her involvement. We propose a model of imperfect information and derive conditions under which delegation arises in equilibrium: it occurs when the opportunity cost of participation in the decision is large compared to the preference gap between spouses. A key implication is that the spouse who receives authority may achieve lower welfare than the one who delegates. We test these predictions in two incentivized experiments conducted among couples in Belgium/France and Benin, finding strong support across both contexts. Survey evidence further confirms the external validity of the results. Our findings suggest that standard survey measures of intra-household bargaining, by conflating strategic delegation with disempowerment, may incorrectly reflect the distribution of power within households.

Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2026-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nam:defipp:2605

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