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Growth-Friendly Dictatorships

Giacomo De Luca (), Anastasia Litina () and Petros Sekeris ()

No 1209, Working Papers from University of Namur, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we show that in highly unequal societies, different societal groups may support a rent-seeking dicator serving their interests better than the median voter in a democratic regime. Importantly, it is the stakes of dictator in the economy, in the form of capital ownership, that drives the support of individuals. In particular, in highly societies ruled by a capital-rich dictator endowed with the power to tax and appropriate at will, the elites support dictatorial policies that generate higher growth rates than the ones obtained under democracy. Such support arises despite the total absence of checks and balances on the dictator.

Keywords: Regime type; capital distribution; growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O11 D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2012-09, Revised 2012-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Downloads: (external link) First version, 2012 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Growth-friendly dictatorships (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Growth-Friendly Dictatorships (2012) Downloads
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