Success and Failure of Communities Managing Natural Resources:Static and Dynamic Inefficiencies
No 1601, Working Papers from University of Namur, Department of Economics
This paper presents an analytical framework to understand why some communities successfully manage their renewable natural resources and some fail to do it. We develop a N-players, two-period non-cooperative game where a community can impose some exogenous amount of sanctions. We first show that rules preventing dynamic inefficiencies may exist even though static inefficiencies still remain. Second, an increase in the initial value of the resource may lower the utility of all users. The model develop a nuanced view on Ostrom conjecture stating that conservation is harder to implement than sharing.
Keywords: Common-pool resource; Renewable resource; Conservation; Sanctions; Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D23 O13 P48 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-env
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http://www.unamur.be/eco/economie/recherche/wpseries/wp/1601.pdf First version, 2016 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nam:wpaper:1601
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