Some evidence on late bidding in eBay auctions

Ladislav Wintr

No 126, Working Paper Research from National Bank of Belgium

Abstract: Bidding in the last seconds or minutes of an auction is a common strategy in Internet auctions with fixed end-times. This paper examines the three explanations of late bidding in eBay auctions that survived the first scrutiny in Roth and Ockenfels (2002). There is no indication that late bidding could lead to collusive gains for bidders. Late bidding is a strategic response to the presence of bidders placing multiple bids. Experts protecting their private information are typically the last to bid while collectors are often the first. As bidders gain familiarity with eBay rules, they tend to bid slightly earlier

Keywords: Online Auctions; Internet; Late Bidding; eBay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2008-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Related works:
Journal Article: SOME EVIDENCE ON LATE BIDDING IN EBAY AUCTIONS (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbb:reswpp:200801-25

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