Network Interconnection With Competitive Transit

David Gilo () and Yossi Spiegel ()
Additional contact information
David Gilo: Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv
Yossi Spiegel: Recanati Graduate School of Business Administration, Tel Aviv University, http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel/

No 03-05, Working Papers from NET Institute

Abstract: We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two LECs) and a third network (e.g., an IXC) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the …rst LEC’s network. We show that there is a wide set of cases in which competitive transit could justify partial or even complete deregulation of access to a network’s customer base.

Keywords: Interconnection; access pricing; transit; telecommunication; “bill and keep” (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2003-12, Revised 2003-12
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