Strategic Product Pre-announcements in Markets with Network Effects

Jay Choi, Eirik Kristiansen and Jae Nahm

No 05-09, Working Papers from NET Institute

Abstract: It is a widely adopted practice for firms to announce new products well in advance of actual market availability. The incentives for pre-announcements are stronger in markets with network effects because they can be used to induce the delay of consumers’ purchases and forestall the build-up of rival products’ installed bases. However, such announcements often are not fulfilled, raising antitrust concerns. We analyze the effects of product pre-announcements in the presence of network effects when firms are allowed to strategically make false announcements. We also discuss their implications for consumer welfare and anti-trust policy.

JEL-codes: D8 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2005-09, Revised 2005-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-tid
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Journal Article: Strategic Product Pre-announcements in Markets with Network Effects (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:net:wpaper:0509

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