EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Congestion Pricing in an Internet Market

Jose Canals-Cerda ()
Additional contact information
Jose Canals-Cerda: University of Colorado at Boulder

No 05-10, Working Papers from NET Institute

Abstract: This paper analyzes a unique dataset of art auctions on eBay. We study the behavior of buyers and sellers, demand and supply, by means of a novel structural estimation approach. Our empirical framework considers the process of arrival of new bidders as well as the distribution of bidder valuations of artworks being auctioned. We use this empirical framework to quantify the e(ect of market congestion, and congestion pricing strategies implemented by the market intermediary. Because we explicitly model the process of arrival of new bidders, we can estimate the e(ect of congestion pricing on the number of bidders, the distribution of bidders’ valuations, and the final selling price. Using the structural model we can also measure the impact of congestion pricing on the revenues of the artists and the market intermediary, as well as its e(ect on consumer surplus. Our results indicate that the congestion pricing policy acts as a coordination mechanism that facilitates the match between buyers and sellers.

JEL-codes: C51 C72 D44 L11 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2005-09, Revised 2005-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.netinst.org/Canals.pdf (application/pdf)
no

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:net:wpaper:0510

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from NET Institute
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nicholas Economides ().

 
Page updated 2025-02-13
Handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:0510