The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States at the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases

Nicholas Economides () and Ioannis Lianos ()
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Ioannis Lianos: University College London, Faculty of Laws

No 07-47, Working Papers from NET Institute

Abstract: We analyze and contrast the US and EU antitrust standards on mixed bundling and tying. We apply our analysis to the US and EU cases against Microsoft on the issue of tying new products (Internet Explorer in the US, and Windows Media Player in the EU) with Windows as well as to cases brought in Europe and in the United States on bundling discounts. We conclude that there are differences between the EC and US antitrust law on the choice of the relevant analogy for bundled rebates (predatory price standard or foreclosure standard) and the implementation of the distinct product and coercion test for tying practices. The second important difference between the two jurisdictions concerns the interpretation of the requirement of anticompetitive foreclosure. It seems to us that in Europe, consumer detriment is found easily and it is not always a requirement for the application of Article 82, or at least that the standard of proof of a consumer detriment for tying cases is lower than in the US.

Keywords: tying; bundling; foreclosure; requirement contracts; monopolization; Microsoft; predatory pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K12 L12 L13 L41 L42 L63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2007-12, Revised 2007-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eec, nep-ict, nep-law, nep-mkt and nep-net
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Working Paper: The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States at the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:net:wpaper:0747

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