The Welfare Effects of Mobile Termination Rate Regulation in Asymmetric Oligopolies: the Case of Spain

Sjaak Hurkens and Ángel Luis López ()
Additional contact information
Ángel Luis López: Public-Private Sector Research Center, IESE Business School, University of Navarra, http://www.angelluislopez.net/

No 11-09, Working Papers from NET Institute

Abstract: We examine the effects of mobile termination rate regulation in asymmetric oligopolies. We do this by extending existing models of asymmetric duopoly and symmetric oligopoly where consumer expectations about market shares are passive. We first calibrate product differentiation parameters using detailed data from the Spanish market from 2010. Next, we predict equilibrium outcomes and welfare effects under alternative scenarios of future termination rates. Lowering termination rates typically lowers profits of all networks and improves consumer and total surplus.

Keywords: Mobile Termination Rates; Network Effects; Simulations; Telecommunications; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K23 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2011-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The welfare effects of mobile termination rate regulation in asymmetric oligopolies: The case of Spain (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:net:wpaper:1109

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