Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting
Bernhard Ganglmair () and
No 11-15, Working Papers from NET Institute
We present a model of industry standard setting with two-sided asymmetric information about the existence of intellectual property. We provide an equilibrium analysis of (a) firms' incentives to communicate ideas for improvements of an industry standard, and (b) firms' decisions to disclose the existence of intellectual property to other participants of the standardization process.
Keywords: patent holdup; patent disclosure; standard setting organizations; industry standards; disclosure rules; conversation; asymmetric information; Bertrand competition. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 L15 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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Chapter: Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting (2012)
Working Paper: Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:net:wpaper:1115
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