Defending a Star: Coordinating the Defense of a Network

Kory M. Garner ()
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Kory M. Garner: Department of Economics, Purdue University

No 12-25, Working Papers from NET Institute

Abstract: This experiment focuses on a contest played over a star network of 6 nodes. By placing targets in a network, the value of a target is dependent on its connectivity to other targets. The experiment compares the cases where the defense is centrally planned by a defense planner with a case where the defense is coordinated by six individuals each placed at one node in the network. By additionally varying how many targets the attacker may target, the experimental design consists of a 2 × 2 design. Attackers tend to over exert effort on the Center Node whereas defenders tend to place too little effort on the Center Node (with one exception). These attack and defense allocations lead to defenders earning smaller than equilibrium profits (again with one exception). It appears that Defense Planners manage to plan a defense better than the Coordinated Defenders when facing an attacker who may only target one node. However, Defense Planners are not certain to perform better than Coordinated Defenders as the Planner earns a smaller profit on average (but is less volatile in his earnings).

Keywords: Contests; Star Network; Robust Networks; Coordinated Defense; Defense Planner; Laboratory Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2012-09, Revised 2012-10
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