Farsightedly Stable Matchings

Nikita Roketskiy ()

No 12-26, Working Papers from NET Institute

Abstract: We study the properties of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in application to matching models. We show that the result by Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) for hedonic games can be extended to a general matching with contracts framework: a collection of singleton stable sets constitutes a weak core of the matching with contracts game. We also show that singleton stable sets are invariant under different contractual languages.

Keywords: farsighted; stable; sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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