An Empirical Analysis of a Crowdfunding Platform

Jin-Hyuk Kim (), Peter Newberry and Calvin Qiu ()
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Jin-Hyuk Kim: University of Colorado at Boulder, Department of Economics, 256 UCB, Boulder, CO 80309, USA
Calvin Qiu: ICF International, 19/F Heng Shan Centre, 145 Queen's Road East, Wan Chai, Hong Kong

No 15-12, Working Papers from NET Institute

Abstract: Crowdfunding, a fundraising mechanism in which monetary contributions are raised from a large number of people, is booming and impacting government policy. We study two features of a well-known crowdfunding platform, Kickstarter.com. First, we study the role of observable information in determining whether or not a donor contributes to the project. Second, we study the effect of the all-or-nothing nature of donations. Our counterfactual analyses indicate that the observability of donor information increases the expected quality of funded projects while the conditionality of pledges decreases it.

Keywords: Crowdfunding; Social learning; Value of information; Free-riding; Voluntary contribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 G11 G14 L26 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent, nep-net and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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