Excessive Content Moderation

Ivan Rendo ()
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Ivan Rendo: Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole

No 25-02, Working Papers from NET Institute

Abstract: Unregulated online platforms often host extreme and socially undesirable content. As mainstream platforms tighten moderation, some users shift to unmoderated alternatives, leading to a leakage of extreme content. I develop a duopoly model where an ad-funded mainstream platform competes with an unmoderated fringe. Heterogeneous users choose platforms and create content reflecting their views. The mainstream platform trades off attracting fringe users with making content safer for advertisers. With strong network effects, the socially optimal moderation is more lenient than the profit-maximizing one. Therefore, regulation mandating stricter moderation may backfire by increasing overall content unsafety.

Keywords: content moderation; platforms; social media; user-generated content. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L82 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2025-09
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