The Trump tariffs: an unpleasant political economy rationale

Mark Setterfield ()
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Mark Setterfield: Department of Economics, New School for Social Research, USA

No 2610, Working Papers from New School for Social Research, Department of Economics

Abstract: According to Blecker (2027), while tariffs per se are not always and everywhere unwarranted (Blecker, 2026), the Trump tariffs will fail on their own terms. Making this argument necessitates suspending disbelief, so as to interpret the Trump tariffs as economic policy -- something that various commentators, who regard the tariffs as no more than political theatre, refuse to indulge. The argument here is that distinguishing between political chicanery and economics in this fashion involves a false dichotomy. Acknowledging the potential relationship between the two permits analysis that points towards an unpleasant political economy rationale for the Trump tariffs.

Keywords: Trump tariffs; Authoritarian Neoliberalism; social structure of accumulation; capital-citizen accord (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 E02 F02 F13 P16 P51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hme
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