Revenue-recycling within Transport Networks

Yukihiro Kidokoro

No 08-07, GRIPS Discussion Papers from National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

Abstract: This paper analyzes the second-best pricing and investment policy for transport networks with a revenue-recycling mechanism in which the toll revenue is used as transport investments or subsidies, as in London’s congestion charging scheme. The results of this paper demonstrate that the way toll revenue is used significantly modifies the usual results, where a lump-sum transfer is assumed. First, revenue-recycling as investment has an effect that works to increase the second-best toll when the benefits from it are larger than the costs. Revenue-recycling as a subsidy does not have such an effect. Second, ‘partial’ cost?benefit analysis that focuses only on the targeted transport mode would usually lead to a false conclusion as to whether the toll revenues should be used as transport investments, subsidies, or general tax revenues. The ‘full’ cost? benefit analysis, which includes changes in consumer surplus and producer surplus in all transport modes, is necessary.

Keywords: Congestion tax; Revenue-recycling; Road pricing; Transport Network; Costbenefit analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L91 R41 R42 R48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2008-07
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://grips.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_ac ... bute_id=20&file_no=1 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Revenue recycling within transport networks (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ngi:dpaper:08-07

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in GRIPS Discussion Papers from National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).