Economic theory and game theory

From Nir Dagan
Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Management, Tel-Hai Academic College, Upper Galilee, Israel..
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021: Tax evasion, informants, and optimal auditing policy

Nir Dagan and Yossi Tobol

020: An axiomatization of the leveling tax-transfer policy

Nir Dagan

019: The time-preference Nash solution

Nir Dagan, Oscar Volij and Eyal Winter

018: A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution

Nir Dagan, Oscar Volij and Eyal Winter

016: A Critique on the Theory of Linear Price Monopoly

Nir Dagan

015: Extensive Form Games with Coalitional Actions

Nir Dagan

014: Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition

Nir Dagan, Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij

013: Recontracting and Competition

Nir Dagan

012: Consistency and the Walrasian Allocations Correspondence

Nir Dagan

011: Consistent Solutions in Exchange Economies: a Characterization of the Price Mechanism

Nir Dagan

010: Formation of Nations in a Welfare State Minded World

Nir Dagan and Oscar Volij

009: Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods

Nir Dagan, Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij

008: On the Least Sacrifice Principle in Taxation

Nir Dagan

007: Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium"

Nir Dagan, Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij

006: Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games

Nir Dagan and Roberto Serrano

005: A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules

Nir Dagan, Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij

004: Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems

Nir Dagan and Oscar Volij

003: A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule

Nir Dagan

002: New Characterizations of Old Bankruptcy Rules

Nir Dagan

001: The Bankruptcy Problem: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach

Nir Dagan and Oscar Volij