Formation of Nations in a Welfare State Minded World

Nir Dagan () and Oscar Volij ()

Economic theory and game theory from Nir Dagan

Abstract: We model the endogenous formation of nations in a world economy where nations apply redistributive policies. We show that stronger distributive policies may lead to greater inequality in the world's distribution of income as a result of rich individuals tending to form their own nations. By the same token, stable economic integration occurs only when redistributive policies are not too strong.

Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1995, Revised 1999-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory 2:157-181 (2000)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Formation of Nations in a Welfare‐State Minded World (2000)
Working Paper: Formation of Nations in a Welfare-State Minded World (2000)
Working Paper: Formation of Nations in a Welfare State Minded World (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nid:ndagan:010

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