Consistent Solutions in Exchange Economies: a Characterization of the Price Mechanism

Nir Dagan ()

Economic theory and game theory from Nir Dagan

Abstract: We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means of four axioms: consistency, replica invariance, individual rationality and Pareto optimality. It is shown that for any given class of exchange economies any solution that satisfies the axioms is a selection from the Walrasian allocations with slack. Preferences are assumed to be smooth, but may be satiated and non-convex. A class of economies is defined as all economies whose agents' preferences belong to an arbitrary family (finite or infinite) of types. The result can be modified to characterize equal budget Walrasian allocations with slack by replacing individual rationality with individual rationality from equal division. The results are valid also for classes of economies in which core--Walras equivalence does not hold.

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1995-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.nirdagan.com/research/199501/full.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Consistent solutions in exchange economies: A characterization of the price mechanism (1995)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nid:ndagan:011

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economic theory and game theory from Nir Dagan Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Management, Tel-Hai Academic College, Upper Galilee, Israel..
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nir Dagan ().