The time-preference Nash solution

Nir Dagan (), Oscar Volij () and Eyal Winter ()

Economic theory and game theory from Nir Dagan

Abstract: We give an axiomatic characterization of the Time-Preference Nash Solution, a bargaining solution that is applied when the underlying preferences are defined over streams of physical outcomes. This bargaining solution is similar to the ordinal Nash solution introduced by Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992), but it gives a different prediction when the set of physical outcomes is a set of lotteries.

JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2001-03-27
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Time-Preference Nash Solution (2001)
Working Paper: The Time-Preference Nash Solution (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nid:ndagan:019

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