In Defense of DEFECT or Cooperation does not Justify the Solution Concept

Oscar Volij ()

Economic theory and game theory from Oscar Volij

Abstract: The one-state machine that always defects is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the machine game that is derived from the prisoners' dilemma, when preferences are lexicographic in the complexity. This machine is the only stochastically stable strategy of the machine game when players are restricted to choosing machines with a uniformly bounded complexity.

Keywords: Cooperation; prisoners' dilemma; automata; evolution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-12-30, Revised 1999-08-26
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 39, 309--321 (2002).

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