On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes

Oscar Volij ()

Economic theory and game theory from Oscar Volij

Abstract: We revisit the well known result that asserts that and increase in the degree of one's risk aversion improves the position one's opponents. for this purpose, we apply Yaari's dual theory of choice under risk both to Nash's bargaining problem and to Rubinstein's game of alternating offers. Within this theory and unlike under expected utility, risk aversion influences the bargaining outcome only when this outcome is random, namely, when the players are risk lovers. In this case, an increase in ones degree of risk aversion, increases one's share of the pie.

Keywords: Bargaining; non-expected utility; risk aversion. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-09-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior 41(1), 120-140, (2002)

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Journal Article: On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes (2002)
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