A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility
Oscar Volij ()
Economic theory and game theory from Oscar Volij
We show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein's (1982) game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected utility maximizers.
Keywords: Bargaining; non-expected utility. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 44(1), 1-15, September 2002.
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Journal Article: A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility (2002)
Working Paper: A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nid:ovolij:016
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