IMF arrangements, politics and the timing of stabilizations

Francisco Veiga

No 2/2002, NIPE Working Papers from NIPE - Universidade do Minho

Abstract: This paper analyses the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrangements on the timing of inflation stabilization programs. Essentially, we test the hypothesis that IMF aid accelerates stabilization using probit and proportional hazards models. As in theoretical models, results are mixed: larger withdrawals of the amounts agreed to seem to hasten stabilization, but there is weak evidence that IMF arrangements lead to greater delays. Concerning other effects, greater fragmentation of the political system delays stabilization while higher inflation tends to hasten it. Other political and economic variables do not seem to have significant effects on the timing of stabilizations.

Keywords: IMF; stabilization; timing; politics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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