Spending more is spending less: on the desirability of enforcing migration

Alessandra Casarico, Giovanni Facchini and Tommaso Frattini

No 2012006, Norface Discussion Paper Series from Norface Research Programme on Migration, Department of Economics, University College London

Abstract: We study the migration policy set by a welfare maximizing government in a model where immigrant workers differ in their skills and are imperfectly matched with heterogenous occupations. The policy fixes a minimum skill level for legal migrants, and foreign workers that fall below it can only enter the country illegally. We start by analyzing under which conditions an amnesty is desirable compared to tolerating undocumented immigrants. Next, we study when it is preferable to have ex-ante lax enforcement, rather than to carry out costly enforcement. We show that three channels play an important role in this decision: an amnesty is more likely the larger are the output gains brought about by the legalization, the less redistributive is the welfare state and the higher is the expected cost of criminal activities carried out by illegal immigrants. Importantly, we also find that, when an amnesty is desirable, the destination country would reach an even higher welfare level investing in enforcement ex-ante. Empirical evidence based on a novel panel dataset of legalization programs carried out by a group of OECD countries between 1980-2007 broadly supports the role played by the channels identified in our theoretical model.

Keywords: Illegal immigration; Immigration Policy; Amnesties. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 J61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mig
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.norface-migration.org/publ_uploads/NDP_06_12.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nor:wpaper:2012006

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Norface Discussion Paper Series from Norface Research Programme on Migration, Department of Economics, University College London Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Norface Migration Administrator () and Thomas Cornelissen ().