 Fundraising through Competition: Evidence from the LabNo 2008-11, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham Abstract: This paper investigates mechanisms for the private provision of a public good which utilize competition to incentivize contributions. Theory predicts that “all-pay” competition is particularly effective for fundraising. Within this class of mechanisms different types of lotteries and all-pay auctions are analyzed and ranked. Four all-pay competition mechanisms are then examined in a laboratory experiment vis-à-vis a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). All four outperform the VCM and towards the end of the experiment fully efficient outcomes are attained in the “lowest common denominator” scheme, which is particularly accommodating for people who have a preference for cooperating conditionally on others doing their bit. Keywords: Public Goods; Provision Mechanisms; Experiments; Contests (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:not:notcdx:2008-11 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham School of Economics University of Nottingham University Park Nottingham NG7 2RD. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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