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Learning to Coordinate: Co-Evolution and Correlated Equilibrium

Alejandro Lee-Penagos ()
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Alejandro Lee-Penagos: School of Economics, University of Nottingham

No 2016-11, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: In a coordination game such as the Battle of the Sexes, agents can condition their plays on external signals that can, in theory, lead to a Correlated Equilibrium that can improve the overall payoffs of the agents. Here we explore whether boundedly rational, adaptive agents can learn to coordinate in such an environment. We find that such agents are able to coordinate, often in complex ways, even without an external signal. Furthermore, when a signal is present, Correlated Equilibrium are rare. Thus, even in a world of simple learning agents, coordination behavior can take on some surprising forms.

Keywords: Battle of the Sexes; Correlated Equilibrium; Evolutionary Game Theory; Learning Algorithms; Coordination Games; Adaptive Agents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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