Nudging the electorate: what works and why?

Felix Koelle, Tom Lane (), Daniele Nosenzo and Chris Starmer ()
Additional contact information
Felix Koelle: Department of Economics, University of Cologne
Chris Starmer: School of Economics, University of Nottingham
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Felix Kölle

No 2017-05, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: We report two studies investigating whether, and if so how, different interventions affect voter registration rates. In a natural field experiment conducted before the 2015 UK General Election, we varied messages on a postcard sent by Oxford City Council to 7,679 unregistered student voters encouraging them to register to vote. Relative to a baseline, emphasising negative monetary incentives (the possibility of being fined) significantly increased registration rates, while positive monetary incentives (chances of winning a lottery) and purely non-monetary nudges had no overall effects. In the second study, we show that these differences can be partly explained by social norms.

Keywords: Voter Registration; Voting; Field Experiment; Nudging; Social Norms; Fines; Rewards (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Nudging the electorate: what works and why? (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:not:notcdx:2017-05

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