Solving normative conflicts in collective action by promoting redistribution

Lata Gangadharan (), Jona Krutaj () and Marie Claire Villeval ()
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Lata Gangadharan: Monash University
Jona Krutaj: University of Nottingham
Marie Claire Villeval: University of Lyon

No 2026-03, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: Heterogeneous returns from contributions to a public good create a normative conflict between equality and efficiency. In a laboratory experiment, we proposed an indicative menu of contribution principles including one featuring a decentralized redistribution mechanism ensuring earnings equality in exchange for fully efficient contributions. Although a majority of individuals, when in the position of an impartial observer, considered this principle to be the most appropriate and expected others to agree, they failed to act on it. Designating a leader who endorsed this principle and made non-binding recommendations enabled a majority of groups to adopt it successfully. This resulted in full contributions and earnings equalization through redistribution from advantaged to disadvantaged members, effectively resolving the conflict.

Keywords: Normative conflict; Redistribution; Efficiency; Leadership; Reciprocity; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-03
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