Licensing a new product: Fee vs. royalty licensing with unionized labor market

Arijit Mukherjee

Discussion Papers from University of Nottingham, School of Economics

Abstract: We show that, for licensing by an outside innovator in a Cournot oligopoly, royalty licensing can generate higher payoff to the innovator than the fixed-fee licensing and auction if the labor market is unionized. This result holds irrespective of the unionization structure.

Keywords: Auction; Fixed-fee; Labor union; Licensing; Royalty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/documents/discussion-papers/07-03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Licensing a new product: Fee vs. royalty licensing with unionized labor market (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:not:notecp:07/03

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Nottingham, School of Economics School of Economics University of Nottingham University Park Nottingham NG7 2RD. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().