A Paradox of Environmental Awareness Campaigns

Christos Koulovatianos

Discussion Papers from University of Nottingham, School of Economics

Abstract: We build a workable game of common-property resource extraction under rational Bayesian learning about the renewal prospects of a resource. We uncover the impact of exogenously shifting the prior beliefs of each player on the response functions of others. What we ?find about the role of environmental conservation campaigns is paradoxical. To the extent that such campaigns instill overly high pessimism about the potential of natural resources to reproduce, they create anti-conservation incentives: anyone having exploitation rights becomes inclined to consume more of the resource earlier, before others overexploit, and before the resources stock is reduced to lower levels.

Keywords: renewable resources; resource exploitation; non-cooperative dynamic games; Bayesian learning; stochastic games; commons; rational learning; uncertainty; beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Paradox of Environmental Awareness Campaigns (2011)
Working Paper: A Paradox of Environmental Awareness Campaigns (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:not:notecp:10/17

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