Can International Migration Ever Be Made a Pareto Improvement?

Wilhelm Kohler and Gabriel Felbermayr

Discussion Papers from University of Nottingham, GEP

Abstract: We argue that compensating losers is more difficult for immigration than for trade and capital movements. While a tax-cum-subsidy mechanism allows the government to turn the gains from trade into a Pareto improvement, the same is not true for the so-called immigration surplus, if the redistributive mechanism is not allowed to discriminate against migrants. We discuss policy conclusions to be drawn from this fundamental asymmetry between migration and other forms of globalization.

Keywords: Migration Surplus; Redistribution; Pareto Improvement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/gep/documents/papers/2009/09-01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Chapter: Can International Migration Ever Be Made a Pareto Improvement? (2014)
Chapter: Can International Migration Ever be Made a Pareto Improvement? (2009)
Working Paper: Can International Migration Ever Be Made a Pareto Improvement? (2009)
Chapter: Can international migration ever be made a pareto improvement?
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:not:notgep:09/01

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Nottingham, GEP School of Economics University of Nottingham University Park Nottingham NG7 2RD. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Hilary Hughes ().