Teachers' desired mobility to disadvantaged schools: Do financial incentives matter?
J. Silhol and
Lionel Wilner
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J. Silhol: Insee, AMSE
Documents de Travail de l'Insee - INSEE Working Papers from Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques
Abstract:
This paper exploits a 2018 reform of teachers' financial incentives to work in some French disadvantaged schools, and determines the role of incentives in teachers' stated preferences to move towards such schools based on this quasi-natural experiment. Using data from the internal human resource management of an educational authority, we find that most responsive teachers are less qualified, have less experience and are already working in such areas. Counterfactual simulations suggest that the policy has not hurt other disadvantaged schools, but rather induced some teachers not to remain in their current school or to opt less for regular schools.
Keywords: Teacher mobility; Financial incentives; Stated preferences; Rank-ordered choices; Disadvantaged schools (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 I22 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma and nep-ure
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https://www.bnsp.insee.fr/ark:/12148/bc6p08brqzs/f1.pdf Document de travail de la DESE numero 2023/09 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Teachers' Desired Mobility to Disadvantaged Schools: Do Financial Incentives Matter? (2022) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nse:doctra:2023-09
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