Wage Bargaining and Employer Objectives

Torberg Falch

Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Abstract: This paper compares union wage bargaining outcomes across different types of employers. Five different employer objectives are discussed; profit–, welfare– and output maximization, and two specifications of a Leviathan. The model shows that the ordering of the union wage level across employer types depends on the functional form of product demand. With constant elasticity of product demand, the wage tends to be lowest in the output maximization case, while with a linear product demand, the wage tends to be lowest under welfare maximization.

Keywords: Wage bargaining; Employer objectives; Wage differentials (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2002-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-lab and nep-pke
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Related works:
Journal Article: Wage Bargaining and Employer Objectives (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nst:samfok:2402

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