Wage Bargaining and Monopsony

Torberg Falch and Bjarne Strøm

Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Abstract: This paper identifies three possible outcomes of higher relative firm bargaining power in a unionized firm facing an upward sloping labor supply curve. The conventional regime with reduced wage and higher employment corresponds to firm bargaining power below a certain critical value. A supply constrained regime where increased firm bargaining power reduces both wages and employment occurs when the bargaining power is above another critical level. A novel result is that we identify a third regime, with firm bargaining power between these critical levels, where changes in relative bargaining power does not affect wages and employment.

Keywords: Monopsony; Unions; Wage bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J3 J5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2004-09-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iso/WP/2004/8Wagebargainingandmonopsony_WP.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Wage bargaining and monopsony (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nst:samfok:4304

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anne Larsen ().