Property Taxation as a Determinant of School District Efficiency
Marte Rønning and
Jon Fiva ()
Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Recent theoretical contributions have emphasized the favorable incentive effects of property taxation. The object of this paper is to confront these theories with Norwegian data on student performance. The institutional setting in Norway is well suited to analyzing the effects of property taxation because we can compare school districts with and without property taxation. In addition, we focus on an alternative incentive mechanism - competition between school districts. The empirical results indicate that students in school districts that levy residential property taxes perform better at the national examination than students in comparable school districts. Strategic interaction in school quality is present, but the magnitude of the interaction effect is modest.
Keywords: Student achievement; efficiency; property taxation; competition; spatial auto-regressive model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 H71 I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2004-08-01, Revised 2005-07-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nst:samfok:5105
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