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Constitutions and the resource curse

Jørgen Andersen () and Silje Aslaksen ()
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Silje Aslaksen: Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Abstract: Recent advances in the political economy literature suggests that constitutional arrangements determine a wide range of economic pol icy outcomes. In particular, it is argued that different forms of government (presidential versus parliamentary) induce more or less 'growth promoting' policies. However, effects on long run growth have proved harder to identify. We exploit the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed to identify differences in the long-term performance of economies with different constitutional forms. Existing theory suggests that the presence of vast natural resources should affect growth differently in countries with different constitutional designs. Empirically we find strong support for this hypothesis - constitutions indeed seem to matter for how natural resource abundance affects long run growth. In fact, the form of government matters more than democratic rule. We also find interaction effects of electoral rules (majority versus proportional voting) and resource abundance on growth, although these effects are less clear-cut and less robust.

Keywords: Growth; Political economy; Constitution; Resource curse; Institutions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E61 F43 O13 P51 Q32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2006-04-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mac, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Constitutions and the resource curse (2008) Downloads
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