Social Cognition in the Evolutionary Chicken Game
Robert Hoffmann ()
Occasional Papers from Industrial Economics Division
This paper explores a model of bounded rationality in evolutionary game play in which agent choice is based on a social psychological process of categorization and social inference. The computer simulation of the model demonstrates that agents' increasing ability to categorize opponents in the chicken game affords a higher population average payoff and introduces increasing social stratification among them. Greater trait diversity and population size are shown to have a harmful effect on payoffs. A VERSION OF THIS PAPER IS FORTHCOMING IN COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS UNDER THE TITLE "THE COGNITIVE ORGINS OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION".
Keywords: bounded rationality; social cognition; chicken game; stereotypes; categorization; adaptive expectations; social inference; discrimination; social stratification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10-10, Revised 2001-04-10
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Working Paper: Social Cognition in the Evolutionary Chicken Game (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nub:occpap:2
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